

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 008860  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 008860

NODIS

FOR DR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 287 ACTION SECSTATE DATED JAN 12:

QTE:S E C R E T ANKARA 287

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS(3)

TAGS: PFOR, TU

SUBJECT: US-TURKISH RELATIONS

REF: 212

1. I THINK THAT WE HAVE DONE MORE THAN SIMPLY SHIFT  
PRIME MINISTERS IN THIS COUNTRY, AND WE MAY FIND THAT TURKEY  
NOW IS BEING LED BY MORE THAN JUST A POLITICIAN.  
MY INSTINCT ABOUT HIM MAY BE WRONG, BUT I RECOGNIZE  
SOME OF THE OUTWARD SIGNS OF THE STATESMAN IN ECEVIT: HE  
THINKS IN LARGE TERMS; HE IS IMPATIENT WITH NITPICKING AND  
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BUREAUCRATIC CONSERVATISM; HE SEEMS TO HAVE A SELF-  
CONFIDENTLY CLEAR CONCEPT OF WHERE HE IS GOING AND  
WHAT HIS PRIORITIES ARE. ON THE ISSUES OF CYPRUS  
AND THE US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS, HE SEEMS TO BE  
DOING JUST WHAT I THINK THE DOCTOR ORDERED. HE SEEMS TO  
BE PREPARED TO CAST OFF REAL OR IMAGINED POLITICAL SHACKLES  
AND TAKE THE INITIATIVE WITH A BOLD, CONSTRUCTIVE PLAN

FOR CYPRUS. I AM PERSUADED THAT HE WILL APPROACH THE GREEKS IN AN OPEN AND FRIENDLY WAY, BUT HE WILL INSIST ON THE NECESSITY OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE POLITICAL REALITIES, AS HE SEES THEM, OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN CYPRUS AND WHICH PRECLUDED RADICAL CHANGES ON THE MAP. HE IS IN MY JUDGMENT BONA FIDE IN WANTING A WORKABLE, INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. WHILE HE IS SUSPICIOUS OF THEM, I HAVE NEVER HEARD HIM USE THE KIND OF NARROWLY NEGATIVE WORDS ABOUT THE GREEKS THAT WE WERE WONT TO HEAR FROM MANY OF HIS PREDECESSORS, AND CURRENTLY FROM SO MANY OF THE GREEKS ABOUT THE TURKS. I THINK HE LOOKS AT CARAMANLIS AS A STATESMAN, A MAN OF GOOD WILL, SOMEBODY WITH WHOM HE CAN DO BUSINESS.

2. HE IS GOING TO GO AHEAD WITH ALL OF THIS REGARDLESS OF THE STATUS OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. HIS REASONS, I SUSPECT, ARE A MIXTURE OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND GOOD POLITICS. WHILE HE IS POLITELY INTERESTED IN THE "SCENARIOS" WE DEVELOPED WITH HIS PREDECESSORS, I WOULD GUESS HE REGARDS THEM AS PRETTY MUCH IRRELEVANT EXCEPT FOR WHAT THEY DISCLOSED ABOUT OUR MOTIVATION TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP.

3. I BELIEVE HE IS GENUINE IN TELLING US HE WANTS TO RESTORE OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, AND HE HAS A DEEP INTELLECTUAL INTEREST IN HOW THAT RELATIONSHIP FITS INTO A LARGER SCHEME-- AS WELL AS A POLITICAL INTEREST IN AVOIDING  
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THE APPEARANCE OF SUBSERVIENCE. WHILE HE DOES NOT TRUST US, HE REGARDS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AS IMPORTANT AND NOT A SUBJECT FOR PETTY BARGAINING, BUT HE BELIEVES THAT IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE SUCH A RELATIONSHIP. I THINK THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE DCA IS OR IS NOT THE PROPER INSTRUMENT FOR CODIFYING OUR RELATIONSHIP AS A "DETAIL", ALTHOUGH I EXPECT THAT HE WILL CONCLUDE THAT IT IS AN ADEQUATE ONE. HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER CONTINUATION OF THE EMBARGO, WHICH HE ALONG WITH ALL TURKS REGARD AS MANIFESTLY UNFAIR, AS EVIDENCE THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP HE WANTS WITH US. AND IF HE GETS THAT KIND OF EVIDENCE, HE IS CAPABLE OF MOVING DECISIVELY DOWN ALTERNATIVE PATHS.

4. HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO ALL OF THIS? FIRST, EVEN IF MY JUDGMENT IS NOT TOTALLY CORRECT, WE SHOULD GIVE HIM THE BENEFIT OF ANY DOUBTS, REACTING IN ALL OF OUR COMMENTS IN WHAT HE IS DOING, AS IF WE ASSUMED HE WAS ACTING ON STATESMANLIKE PRINCIPLES.

5. SECONDLY, WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE, I BELIEVE, BUT

TO MODERATE OUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM (WHILE MAINTAINING OUR INTEREST OPENLY) AND SEE WHAT HE CAN DO WITH THE RUN HE IS ABOUT TO MAKE, HELPING OUT WHERE EITHER HE OR THE GREEKS THINK WE CAN. I FEAR CLARK CLIFFORD IS A SYMBOL OF THE KIND OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT WHICH HE HAS, IN EFFECT, POLITELY BUT FIRMLY ASKED TO PUT ASIDE AT LEAST FOR THE NONCE.

IF I AM CORRECT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE GAME HAS CHANGED, I HOPE WE WILL NOT PRESS THEM ON "SCENARIO" ISSUES SUCH AS A CLIFFORD VISIT OR WHEN THEY ARE GOING TO MAKE FURTHER TROOP WITHDRAWALS, OR ON MARGINALIA LIKE MISSING PERSONS.

6. THIRDLY, I RECOMMEND WE SHOULD NOT ONLY RESPOND TO  
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HIS BID FOR A HIGH-LEVEL VISITOR, WE SHOULD TRUMP HIS SPECIFIC SUGGESTION WITH AN OFFER BY YOU TO COME THROUGH ANKARA ON YOUR WAY TO OR FROM THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE END OF 1/2 - 1 DAY DISCUSSION HE WANTS, IE ONE ORIENTED TO BROAD ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN TO OPERATIONAL DETAILS. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A GOOD INITIAL RESPONSE ON OUR PART, AN INDICATION WE THINK THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE. ALSO IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN KEEPING THINGS ON THE PATH THEY SEEM TO BE SET.

7. FINALLY, I THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT, JUST AS SOON AS HE CAN AFTER WE RECEIVE A SIGNAL FROM THE TURKS THAT THEY DO, IN FACT, REGARD THE DCA AS THE RIGHT EMBODIMENT, AT LEAST AS THE FIRST STEP, OF THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP THEY WANT WITH US, SHOULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE IS ASKING THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FILLUP FOR ECEVIT AND AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL FOR THIS ENTIRE COUNTRY, FOR WHOM THE EMBARGO IS A DEEP PSYCHIC HURT. IT WILL REVERSE THE STEADY AND CONTINUING DETERIORATION IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AS WELL AS OPEN THE WAY TO A REBUILDING OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE IN A PARLOUS STATE, AND BECOMING TO BE SEEN AS AN INCREASINGLY SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR OUR ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.  
SPIERS  
UNQTE CHRISTOPHER

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